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CONFLICT AS MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE: THE CASE OF 
COFFEE FARMERS’ COOPERATIVES IN MOSHI, TANZANIA
David Gongwe Mhando
Sokoine University of Agriculture
ABSTRACT   The policies of the Tanzanian government regarding cooperative societies 
have never been consistent, and frequent policy changes have shaken the foundation of these 
institutions, rendering farmers’ cooperatives unstable and unable to cope with the dynamics 
of production and a market environment. As a result, small-scale farmers have fallen victim 
to organisations whose leaders are corrupt, inexperienced in the management of their 
organisations, overly bureaucratic, and unable to assist farmers in production and marketing 
endeavours. In this context, members of cooperatives have had to deal with issues related to 
confl icts of interest. This paper explores why several rural primary cooperatives in Moshi, 
Tanzania, withdrew from the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperatives Union (KNCU) and formed 
an alternative organisation to produce and market their coffee. Data were obtained from oral 
histories, focus group discussions, case studies, and interviews, as well as a literature review. 
Both internal and external factors contributed to the change in coffee marketing in Moshi. 
These factors include confl icts among the members of the KNCU, the selfi shness of some 
leaders, changes in production and marketing policies, and externally imposed requirements 
for qualifying for loans from commercial banks. Although confl ict among the members of 
the KNCU has been longstanding and inevitable, not enough has been done to improve the 
performance of the KNCU and to increase the security of small-scale farmers engaged in 
coffee marketing.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
I. Theoretical Framework: Confl ict Theories
What holds society together? And what advances it? These are the central 
questions posed by Parsons (1937) in his attempt to resolve the differences that 
arise in social systems. Indeed, confl ict theorists disagree about the nature, causes, 
and effects of confl ict. As a result, no single theory is accepted by scholars, 
although it is also possible that this lack of consensus is attributable to the 
multi-disciplinary nature of confl ict. The early philosophers Machiavelli and 
Hobbes argued that the tendency towards confl ict is not new but is actually a 
basic element of human nature (Dahrendorf, 1958). Furthermore, the Marxist 
theory of confl ict argues that confl ict is a basic structural condition of society. 
Confl ict is an inherent part of human society because human existence is itself 
contradictory. Other theorists, such as Levy & Zaltman (1975), have argued that 
confl ict in inherent in social systems and, when viewed positively, can yield 
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desirable changes, including greater diversity. Additionally, confl ict theorists have 
argued that confl icts are an inevitable part of all human associations. Consequently, 
confl icts are necessary, and, if suppressed, will probably lead to stagnation and 
failure to adapt to changing circumstances (Parsons, 1937). This implies that 
the confl icts within the cooperatives movement in Tanzania were inevitable and 
that it is through solving these confl icts that members have found a way forward. 
According to this perspective, the confl icts of interest among the members of 
cooperatives in Tanzania have led to opening other marketing windows, enabling 
farmers to sell to the highest bidder.
Other confl ict theorists have argued that competition for scarce resources 
necessarily involves confl ict. According to Dahrendorf (1958), Darwin and 
Malthus argued that confl ict and struggle promote the continued existence of 
the human species, as the strongest members survive. Hebert Spencer (1900) 
suggested that confl ict is a natural process that contributes to social evolution, 
and William Sumner (1883) proposed that competition for survival leads to 
social advancement. Simmel (1903) noted that confl icts among the members of 
a society (e.g., fi ghting for more marketing opportunities and better prices for 
crops) can unite people against a common enemy (Parsons, 1937), but such 
confl icts can also assume a negative trajectory and be divisive. The problems 
experienced by the cooperatives in Tanzania have rendered these organisations 
unable to assist farmers with either production or marketing. Following the 
introduction of liberalisation policies, various efforts have been made to allow 
farmers to establish their own groups and sell coffee directly, thereby avoiding 
private traders and the bureaucracy of the cooperatives.
Confl ict can occur at many levels—family, group, or national—and can take 
many forms. For example, confl icts of interest (Straus, 1979) are viewed as 
inevitable features of group dynamics. Such confl icts primarily concern members 
of social groups who disagree with one another based on their personal preferences 
and their individual agendas. In this perspective, individuals and groups may 
demand different things from different levels. If confl icts are not resolved and 
a group is denied its ability to achieve its ends, hostility, which is a result of 
frustration, may develop. Although confl ict is usually depicted as totally negative, 
this is not always the case. Confl ict can yield constructive (positive) or destructive 
(negative) outcomes based on how it is handled by the parties involved. Members 
of cooperatives have been dealing with low prices and lack of support with 
regard to both production and marketing for a long time. Farmers have been 
frustrated by payments that are late and, at times, too little. Constructive criticism, 
the introduction of private traders, and the independence of several of the primary 
cooperatives have led to changes in marketing practices such that farmers now 
have more choices about where to sell their crops.
Although theorists have argued that confl icts are inevitable and may be a 
necessary condition for change and growth, they do not specify how to deal 
with them. Despite assertions that having more confl icts is benefi cial (Straus, 
1979), theorists have remained silent about just how much confl ict is necessary 
and desirable. According to these ongoing discussions in the literature, an absence 
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of confl icts of interest is theoretically impossible, but high levels of confl ict can 
result in high levels of stress and negatively affect everyday life at a family or 
group level. These theorists have also noted that, in everyday life, most people 
fear confl ict and try to avoid it at all costs (Straus, 1979). Consequently, family 
counsellors are concerned with family stability and have developed approaches 
to help families avoid confl ict (Bach & Wyden, 1971). 
However, one fundamental assumption shared by all general confl ict theorists 
is that confl icts are a basic element of human social life. Thus, confl icts emanate 
from the fact that individuals are motivated to act in accordance with their own 
interests. People pursue needs, values, goals, and resources that they defi ne as 
important or desirable. Confl ict within a society may be the result of several 
factors, which is the case for the cooperatives in Moshi, Tanzania. Just as it is 
diffi cult to identify a single factor that is responsible for order within a society, 
so it is diffi cult to specify a single explanation for the emergence of confl icts. 
More often, a combination of factors results in confl icts. However, confl icts are 
benefi cial according to perspectives that view them as a source of personal 
growth or as effective methods for addressing underlying or potential family or 
group problems. Confl ict motivates parties to search for solutions to problems. 
It has been suggested that confl icts can be constructively used to explore different 
solutions to a problem and to stimulate creativity in that they acknowledge and 
facilitate expression of emotional and non-rational arguments while also 
deconstructing long-standing tensions. This explains why some members of the 
rural primary cooperatives that had been operating under the aegis of the 
Kilimanjaro Natives Cooperative Union (KNCU) became independent and formed 
an organisation that addressed their needs related to coffee marketing. This 
process provided farmers with alternative marketing windows and increased their 
options for marketing their products.
This paper explores recent confl icts in the coffee farmers’ cooperatives in 
Tanzania, which are potentially important events, given the role of such 
cooperatives in the agricultural development of Africa. It describes problems 
associated with large organisations in the context of agricultural cooperatives, 
arguing that, in some cases, large organisations do not effi ciently meet farmers’ 
needs. Thus, smaller organisations with lower operating costs may be needed.
II. Brief History of the Cooperatives Movement in Tanzania
Based on their role in development, cooperatives have been defi ned as 
organisations in which a group of people come together to achieve a particular 
economic goal for all members of the group (Cloulte, 1987). These organisations 
achieve their objectives through a democratic process in which each member 
has an equal voice. Thus, members not only participate in discussions regarding 
economic interests, they also engage in and nurture a democratic process for 
doing so. The primary goal of any cooperative is to meet the needs of its 
members in a cost-effective manner (Lyimo, 2012). The cooperatives, as well 
as their underlying principles, are rooted in the philosophy of the Rochdale 
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Pioneers in England, who established a consumer cooperative store in 1884. 
Thus, the Rochdale organisation and it operational patterns have been used as 
a prototype for all contemporary cooperatives worldwide. 
Although there are several kinds of cooperatives, this paper deals only with 
agricultural marketing cooperatives, which are common in agricultural areas such 
as Moshi, Tanzania. Agricultural marketing cooperatives are owned by farmers 
and act to oversee agriculture-related activities, such as the transformation, 
packaging, distribution, and marketing of farm products (both crops and livestock). 
One practical motivation for the creation of agricultural cooperatives has 
sometimes been described as “overcoming the curse of smallness.” As an 
association comprising a large number of small-scale farmers, a cooperative acts 
as a large business in the marketplace, reaping the signifi cant advantages of 
economies of scale that are not available to its members on an individual basis 
(Kimario, 1992).
Cooperatives in contemporary Tanzania have three basic structures: primary, 
secondary, and tertiary. Primary cooperatives, which are usually the smallest 
individual units, are located primarily in villages and are also known as “rural 
cooperative societies” (RCS) in Tanzania. Primary cooperatives consist of 
households of individual farmers. At the secondary level, membership/share-
holding is held by several primary cooperatives (e.g., a cooperative union). Thus, 
secondary cooperatives consist of several rural primary cooperatives. Moreover, 
primary cooperatives are used by cooperative unions as agents for the collection 
of crops from farmers. The KNCU and VUASU of the Kilimanjaro Region and 
the Arusha Region Cooperative Union are a few examples of cooperative unions 
in Tanzania. Tertiary cooperatives are organised at the national level.
The operation of and theory underlying cooperatives in Tanzania have been 
adopted both from the Rochdale Pioneers in England and well as the Chayanov’s 
theory of peasants’ cooperatives, which advocate for agricultural cooperation 
among small-scale farmers. This theory addresses how farmers’ cooperatives can 
enhance their sustainability under pressure from large-scale production 
organisations and private traders, who, in most cases, are more organised than 
the small-scale farmers. It promotes the idea of producers’ cooperatives as forms 
of horizontal integration in agriculture. Furthermore, it operates on the assumption 
that cooperatives are formed by groups of individual farmers or small agricultural 
cooperatives for the purpose of large-scale marketing, purchasing agricultural 
inputs, acquiring credit, and so on. Thus, agricultural production activities are 
best organised in small individual units to preserve incentives; however, in some 
areas, voluntary cooperation among such units is necessary to achieve the 
advantages associated with economies of scale (Chayanov, 1991). Thus, given 
the characteristics of the small-scale farmers in Tanzania, Chayanov’s theory is 
appropriate and applicable to this country.
Cooperatives emerged in Tanzania during the colonial period. The initial 
cooperatives were involved in agricultural marketing, primarily of cash crops 
growing in areas such as Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Bukoba, Mwanza, and Ruvuma. 
The early cooperatives were established to counter exploitation by Asian 
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merchants, who offered lower prices and used fraudulent scales (Kimario, 1992). 
African farmers believed that they would be able to eliminate exploitation by 
the Asian middlemen by combining their resources. Similarly, cooperatives in 
Kilimanjaro developed in response to the efforts of European settlers to 
monopolise coffee production (Kimario, 1992; Lyimo, 2012).
The history of the cooperatives movement in Tanzania is marked by frequent 
changes in the Cooperative Societies Acts and related policies, which have 
resulted in the instability that characterises the present situation. The independent 
government viewed cooperatives as outposts for economic development, and 
thus, the 1963 Cooperative Society Ordinance was designed to spread cooperatives 
to areas without cash crops, which were therefore not economically viable. As 
a result of frequent changes in the Cooperative Societies Acts and related policies, 
cooperatives were organised from the “top,” which weakened the cooperatives 
movement (Lyimo, 2012). The 1967 Arusha Declaration re-organised the 
cooperatives movement to allow cooperatives to participate in socialist projects 
and national development. Cooperatives were seen as potential instruments for 
rural development because of their nature and ability to reach farmers directly. 
Thus, the 1968 Cooperative Societies Act gave the registrars of primary 
cooperatives power over the cooperatives (United Republic of Tanzania, 1968); 
as a result of this re-assignment of power, cooperatives ceased to serve farmers. 
The 1968 Cooperative Societies Act organised cooperatives at the regional level 
rather than according to their economic viability or members’ interests. It was 
claimed that the cooperatives, which had been very instrumental during the 
struggle for independence, had been taken over by those who wanted to benefi t 
by exploiting the farmers. According to this perspective, the cooperatives 
movement had to be re-organised to expel these individuals. Hyden (1976) noted 
that these changes were aimed at extending the central government’s control 
over the rural development process.
The 1976 Ujamaa Villages Act was the most substantial blow to the cooperatives 
movement in Tanzania. Most of the current problems and confl icts of this 
movement are rooted in the Ujamaa era, during which cooperative unions and 
their affi liated primary cooperatives were abolished by the government and 
re-organised at the village level. The new organisation differed from the old in 
that cooperatives were not based at the village level and unions were not based 
at the regional level. Additionally, the functions of these organisations changed, 
as they were supposed to act as multipurpose cooperative societies by purchasing 
all the crops produced in the village. According to the previous arrangement, 
cooperatives were established according to needs of the members and dealt with 
only one crop (Banturaki, 2000) that was familiar to the members. Consequently, 
after the abolition of cooperatives in 1976, one village cooperative was supposed 
to deal with all the crops in its designated areas. The consequence of this change 
was the decline in the production of both cash and food crops (Maghimbi, 1992). 
However, it did not take long for the government to realise its mistake and 
decide to revive the marketing cooperatives. The 1982 Cooperative Societies 
Act re-established cooperatives but placed them under the patronage of the ruling 
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party, making membership almost compulsory. As a result, the cooperatives were 
under the close supervision of the government and the ruling party (Chama cha 
Mapinduzi), which appointed leaders and controlled their daily activities. During 
this period, each village was supposed to be a political wing of the ruling party 
and a multipurpose cooperative at the same time. The election of leaders was 
screened and approved by the ruling party organs; thus, the leaders were 
accountable to the party rather than to the members of the cooperatives (Maghimbi, 
1992; Banturaki, 2000). In other words, cooperatives were introduced from the 
top and not from the grassroots, which is contrary to the principles of cooperatives. 
Once again, farmers lost hope in the cooperatives, which were now imposed on 
them by the government.
III. The End of Three Wasted Decades
The 30 years from 1961 to 1991 were a period during which the cooperatives 
movement in Tanzania made no progress. During this time, the government 
intervened in the operation, vision, and principles of this movement and dictated 
the direction of the cooperatives to the extent that the movement became weak, 
corrupt, bureaucratic, undemocratic, and not transparent with respect to marketing 
activities (Maghimbi, 1992; Banturaki, 2000). Saddled with large debts, the 
government came to regard the cooperatives as a burden. For example, the 
government cancelled the cooperatives’ debt of Tshs. 44 billion in the 1990s 
(Lyimo, 2012). With economic liberalisation and pressure to provide opportunities 
to civil societies, the government was forced to surrender control of the 
cooperatives to their members. However, major damage had already been done. 
Cooperatives, which were ill-prepared for this new autonomy, were forced to 
compete with organised private companies in the free market environment. 
Additionally, most leaders of cooperatives were not experienced in the culture 
of the cooperatives movement and were corrupt, unqualifi ed, and insuffi ciently 
experienced. Furthermore, most members lacked education about cooperatives, 
and thus could not participate effectively. 
Learning from past mistakes, in the 1990s, the government turned to the 
Rochdale model and its principles to manage the cooperatives. In the context 
of these changes, the 1991 Cooperative Societies Act declared membership in 
cooperatives to be voluntary and placed the day-to-day management of the 
cooperatives under the control of the members themselves. However, the 
liberalisation of the economy forced the government to abolish the monopoly 
held by the cooperatives over marketing of domestic crops. Thus, farmers were 
no longer obliged to sell their crops through cooperatives and could sell to 
whoever offered the highest price (Mhando et al., 2013). Additionally, the 1991 
Cooperative Societies Act introduced a process by which members could purchase 
capital shares in cooperatives. Thus, cooperatives, which had no funds to purchase 
crops yet were supposed to run their organisations on a commercial basis, 
introduced membership fees, as well as capital shares. Based on their experience 
of frequent government interference with the management of cooperatives, farmers 
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were sceptical about investing in these organisations (Maghimbi, 1992), as they 
were uncertain about whether the government would interfere again. Most farmers 
declined to join, which resulted few registered members (Mchomvu et al., 2002).
However, the old planned economies were abandoned in the wake of successive 
waves of economic liberalisation. Currently, cooperatives are undergoing a 
renaissance in which the focus is on free markets. Cooperatives are supposed 
to stand on their own and compete on equal footing with private traders. However, 
cooperatives have failed to perform their traditional role of protecting farmers 
by offering low-cost loans for agricultural inputs and price incentives. Given 
that many private buyers pay cash and compete with cooperatives on a level 
playing fi eld to purchase crops, most farmers have no reason to join cooperatives. 
Indeed, farmers have not been able to discern any differences between the 
cooperatives and the private buyers who purchase their crops with cash, as 
neither assists them with production. Thus, most farmers have decided to sell 
their crops to whoever pays the highest cash price.
METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted in the region of Moshi, Kilimanjaro. Two cooperative 
unions are located in the Kilimanjaro region, and membership is based on 
ethnicity. The KNCU covers the districts dominated by the Chagga (Rombo, 
Moshi Rural, and Hai Districts), and Vuasu covers the remaining two districts 
(Mwanga and Same), whose inhabitants are Pare. The KNCU is among the 
oldest cooperative unions and remains the largest in the country. Although it 
has a membership of 92 primary cooperatives, only 70 do business with the 
cooperative, using it as an agent to collect coffee from farmers, and the remaining 
22 work with another marketing organisation. Data in the form of oral histories 
were collected from members of the KNCU and of an independent marketing 
organisation, popularly known as G-32, which was established by primary 
cooperatives that had withdrawn from the KNCU. Focus group discussions were 
conducted in Mshiri, Mruwia, and Materuni villages. Additionally, the researcher 
conducted interviews with key informants and with leaders of the KNCU, the 
G-32, and some of their affi liated cooperatives. A literature search was performed 
to obtain a historical account of the cooperatives movement, particularly in 
Kilimanjaro and Tanzania. Data were analysed through content analysis.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE END OF THE KNCU MONOPOLY 
I. Background of KNCU
The KNCU, which was established in 1924, is the oldest cooperative union 
in Africa. The history of the KNCU dates to 1898, when Catholic missionaries 
planted the fi rst coffee tree at the Kilema mission in Moshi. Initially, the European 
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settlers resisted allowing Africans to grow coffee, fearing that they would spread 
coffee-related diseases as well as reduce the supply of labour to their farms. 
Subsequently, Sir Charles Dandus, the fi rst British District Commissioner, allowed 
the natives (the Chagga) to grow coffee as a cash crop to pay a poll tax to the 
colonial government. However, African coffee farmers were at a disadvantage, 
as they had no reliable market that would offer fair prices. These challenges 
motivated the Chagga to form an organisation to pool their resources to enjoy 
the benefi ts of economies of scale (Kimario, 1992). Although the Kilimanjaro 
Native Planters Association (KNPA) was formed in 1925, it was not until 1933 
that the KNCU was registered under the 1932 Cooperative Societies Ordinance. 
The KNCU was formed by 11 rural primary cooperatives located along the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro: Kibing’oto, Uru Central, Kilema, Kibosho Central, 
Kibosho East, Kibosho West, Machame Central, Mamba, Tarakea, Nkuu Rombo, 
and Usseri. In 1933, the KNCU started to collect coffee from farmers, who 
delivered cherry beans and/or parchment to primary cooperatives for processing 
and/or marketing. The KNCU subsequently collected parchment coffee from the 
primary cooperatives and delivered it to a curing factory in Moshi. The KNCU 
supervised the curing of coffee, which involves hulling and grading coffee and 
then selling the green coffee to the Moshi coffee auction or preparing it for 
direct export.  
Much of the development of the Kilimanjaro region was engineered by the 
KNCU, which flourished well into the 1950s and 1960s (Sutton & Olomi, 2012). 
In 1976, the KNCU, like all other cooperative unions in Tanzania, was dissolved 
when the government abolished all the cooperatives in the country. To maintain 
its assets after abolition, the KNCU registered as the Kilimanjaro Uremi 
Corporation. The government enacted the new Cooperatives Act of 1982, and 
the KNCU and its 92 affi liated primary cooperatives located along slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro were subsequently (1984) revived (Kimario, 1992; Banturaki, 
2000). The KNCU had a membership of 60,000 small-scale farmers; members 
had coffee farm plots measuring 0.5–1.5 acres per 5–7 person family. The area 
covered by small-scale farmers included 74,000 hectares on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro, located 1,000–2,000 meters above sea level (Masenha, 2010).
II. Profi le of the KNCU
As a result of the liberalisation of the coffee industry in the early 1990s, 
private coffee buyers competed on equal ground with the cooperatives to buy 
coffee from farmers. Cooperatives, which were ill-prepared for this development, 
failed to perform as expected (Cooksey, 2011). The KNCU initially lost 80% 
of its market and struggled for four years. At present, only 70 of 92 primary 
cooperatives affi liated with the KNCU are doing business with the KNCU, and 
the remaining 22 members have been operating their coffee business independently 
since the liberalisation and restructuring of the cooperatives movement under 
the revised Cooperative Societies Act of 2002. In 2010, the export revenue of 
the KNCU was 600,000 USD. The core functions of the KNCU are to collect 
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coffee from farmers and to process, grade, and market it. The KNCU works 
with the fair trade movement and supplies coffee for the fair trade-certified 
“Kilimanjaro Roasted Coffee” provided by Café direct (Sutton & Olomi, 2012). 
Recently, the KNCU has been supporting its members in efforts to replace ageing 
coffee trees with newer, more productive and disease-resistant varieties. Although 
Masenha (2010) reported that the KNCU provides extension services, supplies 
coffee seedlings, and provides farmers with coffee-production tools, the researcher 
observed a different situation at Mshiri village, where farmers reported purchasing 
agricultural inputs and coffee seedlings with their own savings. 
III. Confl icts within the KNCU
1. Division and Confl icts of Interest among Members
Although the KNCU covers the areas dominated by the Chagga, it includes 
members who speak different dialects. Basically, the KNCU includes the Moshi 
Rural, Rombo, Marangu, Hai, and Sia Districts, which has led to sharp internal 
divisions. Those from Rombo and Marangu form one group, those from Sia and 
Hai form an opposing group, and those from Moshi Rural (Kibosho and Kilima 
Boro) remain neutral in this confl ict. This division always results in confl icts 
of interest in all matters related to the KNCU. There is a constant struggle over 
the leadership of the KNCU, as each of the two opposing groups seeks to elect 
one of its own as the chairperson by soliciting support from the neutral parties. 
For example, a vice chairperson of the KNCU who was also the Chairperson 
of the Marangu East Primary Society recently colluded with other members to 
defeat a candidate for chairperson. This resulted in a major confl ict in which 
the Member of Parliament from Marangu was ejected from the meeting, and a 
vice chairperson was removed from his post. As revenge, the deposed vice 
chairperson joined an independent organisation and colluded with several members 
to stop the Marangu East Primary Society from engaging in coffee-related 
business with the KNCU. The KNCU has always experienced these divisions 
and confl icts of interest, but the members have remained silent about these 
matters. As was the case in the examples involving the Marangu East Primary 
Society and the Lyamungo Primary Society, selfi shness and personal interests 
have sometimes created divisions and intensifi ed confl icts among members. The 
struggle for power within the KNCU has also been used by politicians to further 
their political ambitions.
2. Fight for Lyamungo Farm
The Lyamungo Primary Society is among the 92 members of the KNCU and 
still conducts business with it. In 1950, the Lyamungo Primary Society received 
a loan from the KNCU and bought 100 acres of coffee-growing land from a 
European settler. The farm covers the area from Sia to Rombo District. However, 
the loan was not repaid, and the KNCU decided to take the matter to court, 
which transferred ownership of the farm, including its title deed, to the KNCU. 
Members of the Lyamungo Primary Society accepted the decision stipulating 
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that they would surrender the farm to the KNCU, but fi ghts and clashes (and 
even deaths) have erupted each time the KNCU has tried to develop the farm. 
The KNCU fi nally abandoned this 90-acre farm, which the Lyamungo Primary 
Society has no legal right to manage. This is another issue that has increased 
division and confl ict among members of the KNCU, who were already divided 
based on location. To date, the dispute has not been settled, and the farm has 
remained unattended.
3. Internal Confl icts within Cooperative Unions
The literature contains many reports of corruption, misappropriation of funds, 
bureaucratic problems, and lack of transparency within the cooperatives movement 
in Tanzania. The 1965 Presidential Special Committee of Inquiry into 
Cooperatives reported, among other problems, a lack of democracy at the union 
level, dishonesty, and unqualifi ed staff (United Republic of Tanzania, 1966). 
Additionally, when cooperatives were abolished in 1976, it was reported that the 
crop authorities did not pay farmers on time and that payment was sometimes 
delayed for more than a year, which affected the motivation to continue with 
production (Maghimbi, 1992). The cooperatives that were re-established in 1984 
were faced with the theft and embezzlement perpetrated by some of their disloyal 
leaders. The accumulated debt to the Commercial Banks accrued by the 
cooperatives was reported to be Tshs. 17.8 billion by 2001 (Lyimo, 2012). The 
2000 Presidential Committee reported, among other problems, misappropriation, 
theft, and an unstable bureaucratic structure and leadership (United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2001).
The problems facing the cooperatives in Tanzania were not experienced by 
KNCU alone. However, the confl icts among members of the KNCU did not 
bring about signifi cant changes in coffee marketing channels. Indeed, these 
confl icts have existed for many years and have been an integral part of the 
cooperatives movement in Tanzania. In fact, these confl icts, coupled with external 
pressure, led to the division of marketing channels among members of the 
KNCU. By 2002, the KNCU was insolvent because of the depression in world 
coffee prices as well as the burden of its debts, which made the union ineligible 
to obtain loans from commercial banks. Some of the commercial banks, such 
as the Cooperative Rural Development Bank and the Kilimanjaro Cooperative 
Bank, refused to continue to offer overdraft protection to the KNCU. Several 
of the primary cooperatives, which came to be known as G-32, unanimously 
voted to undertake their own selling activities. Mhando et al. (2013) noted that 
leaders of the KNCU have been accused by their members of misuse of union 
funds since 1990. For example, 700,000 USD was misappropriated in 2000, and 
leaders failed to account for this money. Finally, the KNCU had to stop fi nancing 
crop purchases because most commercial banks refused to offer loans to them 
for the reasons cited above. It was at this point that some leaders of primary 
cooperatives thought of leaving the KNCU and selling coffee independently.
Additionally, accusations of lack of transparency were made, as members were 
not informed of the price their coffee fetched at auction. This practice was 
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accompanied by the payment of the same price for all grades of coffee, regardless 
of quality. Although the 2012 Coffee Industry Regulation stipulates that coffee 
must be sold based on its quality, members complained that, in most cases, 
payment was similar, which has discouraged them from trying to improve the 
quality of their coffee. Furthermore, the KNCU management has been blamed 
for not being economical and fair with regard to transporting coffee from primary 
cooperatives to curing factories (Mhando & Mbeyale, 2010). For example, it 
seemed unreasonable that farmers from the Mruwia Primary Society, which is 
20 kilometres from the town of Moshi, and those from Rombo, which is 92 
kilometres from Moshi, were charged the same transport fees for one kilogram 
of coffee? Mhando et al. (2013) noted that some members of the KNCU paid 
too much for overhead costs, such as transport and various administrative fees. 
During the focus group discussions at Mruwia village, farmers mentioned that 
being charged for various overhead costs was among the reasons they sought 
alternative marketing channels. However, although these internal factors have 
existed for many years, no signifi cant changes had occurred. Indeed, external 
changes fuelled the fi re that was already burning.
IV. External Factors Contributing to Independence from the KNCU
1. Changes in Coffee-marketing Channels
The coffee industry in Tanzania is controlled by the Tanzanian Coffee Board 
(TCB), whose main responsibilities involve regulating the coffee industry and 
licensing and auctioning coffee. The TCB is responsible for establishing the 
rules and regulations that govern the behaviour of the actors in the Tanzanian 
coffee industry. Thus, since 2002, the TCB has been trying to help farmers 
increase their income by reducing the role of middlemen in the coffee value 
chain. The TCB initially recognised the right of groups of farmers who cooperate 
with one another, primarily at the village level, to undertake coffee production 
and marketing activities. Thereafter, the TCB allowed registered farmers’ groups 
and primary cooperatives to sell their coffee directly at auction (Mhando & Itani, 
2007). This was a major development for some of the primary cooperatives and 
farmers, who decided to organise themselves into registered groups and sell 
coffee directly at the TCB auction in Moshi. They assumed that if they sold 
coffee directly at the auction, they would no longer be agents of the cooperative 
unions, and thus would not have kilogram-based levies deducted by the 
cooperatives. At the same time, they would escape from the bureaucracy, fraud, 
and corrupt practices of the cooperative unions. Ultimately, primary cooperatives 
and farmers’ groups would increase their income per kilogram through selling 
coffee directly at the auction. Because cooperative unions such as the KNCU 
could no longer provide the required services, such as loan-based distribution 
of agricultural inputs and extension services to assist in production, they 
considered the possibility of establishing an organisation that would offer 
additional marketing windows for their coffee.
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2. Flaws in the Nature of Cooperative Businesses
One of the major weaknesses of cooperative unions involves business operations. 
The TCB starts its annual coffee auction in August each year. By this time, 
most coffee exporters have already collected orders from international buyers, 
increasing both demand and prices. In the case of the Kilimanjaro region, coffee 
from Rombo, Mamsea, and Tarakea ripens fi rst and therefore reaches the auction 
when prices are higher. However, as the coffee supply increases, demand decreases, 
and ultimately, prices are reduced as a function of time. Coffee farmers from 
other areas in Kilimanjaro whose coffee ripens later notice that their colleagues 
who sold when the auction started fetched higher prices, and the former group 
demand to be paid at the same rate. The KNCU management lacks transparency 
and does not inform farmers how cooperatives operate. Fearing that refusal to 
meet their demands will lead the farmers to withdraw, the KNCU offers 
impractical false promises that result in the accrual of huge debts, which have 
sometimes been paid by the government. Exploiting the situation for their own 
gain, selfi sh leaders of primary cooperatives use the same strategy and convince 
members that the KNCU does not want to pay them, which leads them to stop 
doing business with the KNCU. However, the fact that 70 of 92 primary 
cooperatives still work with the KNCU and that even some of those who had 
withdrawn have re-joined the KNCU cartel indicates that withdrawing from the 
KNCU is not a permanent solution.
3. Introduction of the Warehouse Receipt System
The Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) was introduced in Tanzania in 2002 
using coffee and cotton as pilot crops (Nyalale et al., 2012). Theoretically, the 
WRS was designed to provide surplus-producing farmers (including smallholders) 
with a marketing window that would allow them to secure the best possible 
deal at all times regardless of season. Thus, through participation in the WRS, 
smallholder producers would deal directly with downstream buyers (at auctions 
and abroad) and fi nanciers (in this case, commercial banks) and increase their 
power within the market chain. Furthermore, the WRS was intended to allow 
farmers’ cooperatives and their groups, which lacked operational capital, to 
participate in the coffee marketing chain by depositing their crops in a warehouse, 
securing loans from commercial banks, and selling directly at auction (Coulter 
& Onumah, 2002). The WRS had four objectives: (i) to minimise the constraints 
that hamper the effective production and marketing of agricultural produce; (ii) 
to increase the money earned from exported agricultural products and overseas 
markets; (iii) to strengthen institutions and to improve the ability of local human 
resources to operate effectively in a liberalised market; and (iv) to increase the 
income of small-scale producers of cotton and coffee by increasing their market 
share. The regions covered under the pilot project involving coffee and cotton 
were Kilimanjaro, Mbeya, Ruvuma, Kigoma, Shinyanga, and Arusha (Kuserwa, 
2009).
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4. Motivation from Commercial Banks
After the introduction of the WRS, commercial banks such as the Kilimanjaro 
Cooperative Bank (KCB), the Cooperative Rural Development Bank, EXIM 
Bank, and the National Microfi nance Bank (NMB) encouraged primary 
cooperatives to borrow money for crop fi nancing and to sell their coffee directly 
at auction. In this way, they convinced primary cooperatives to stop doing 
business with the KNCU and to borrow from them instead. On the one hand, 
commercial banks thought that it would be easier to deal with loans to individual 
primary cooperatives than to deal with those to the KNCU Cartel. On the other 
hand, however, commercial banks also aimed to increase their customer base 
and their business turnover. Mhando & Mbeyale (2010) reported that the KCB 
was more satisfi ed with the rate at which primary cooperatives repaid their loans 
that they were with the rate at which the KNCU repaid theirs.
For the commercial banks, the WRS was a perfect way to deal with cooperative 
unions with bad credit histories related the repayment of debts. In the past, 
cooperative unions had used the overdraft privileges accorded to them by the 
commercial banks, collected their crops, and sold them at auction, presumably 
with the plan to repay their debts to the banks. However, due to high operating 
costs, most cooperative unions, including the KNCU, accumulated huge debts 
that they were unable repay. For example, in 1999, the government cancelled 
the Tanzanian cooperatives’ debt, which totalled Tshs. 44 billion, but it had risen 
to Tshs. 17.8 billion by May 2001 (Lyimo, 2012). Thus, most commercial banks 
used the WRS as a form of self-protection against the cooperative. 
To participate in the WRS, cooperatives apply to borrow a specifi c amount 
from commercial banks. Cooperatives are then obligated to collect a certain 
quantity of the crop they grow and deposit it in a warehouse as collateral. The 
warehouse manager issues a receipt, which is submitted to the bank as a part 
of the payment. Once deposited in a warehouse, the crops are under the control 
of commercial banks. The deposited crop is auctioned by the TCB in Moshi, 
and the money is deposited in the account of the commercial banks. The bank 
then deducts its loan and deposits the balance in the account of the cooperative 
union. It was assumed that this system would prevent cooperative unions from 
accumulating debt. Additionally, even primary cooperatives and farmers’ groups 
could borrow from banks and sell their own coffee directly at auction. The 
introduction of the WRS is among the major reasons that some of the primary 
cooperatives became independent organisations. Backed by a former Marketing 
Manager at the KNCU, these primary cooperatives used an opportunity that 
came at the right time, when they had fi nally tired of the confl icts within the 
KNCU. However, both external and internal forces also motivated some of the 
primary cooperatives to break away from the KNCU and to form their own 
independent marketing organisation. The policy changes enacted since 2002 
motivated and provided opportunities for primary cooperatives and farmers’ 
groups to adopt different approaches to coffee marketing. Thus, withdrawal from 
the KNCU was motivated by timely events and not only by the confl icts within 
the organisation. However, it has also been suggested that the policy changes 
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were used as an excuse by some selfi sh leaders who wanted to benefi t from 
the withdrawals from the KNCU to achieve their own goals.
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE MARKETING WINDOW
I. Events Leading to the Establishment of an Alternative Window
Withdrawal from the KNCU was made possible by the 2002 Cooperative 
Societies Act, which allows one-third of the members of any cooperative union 
to reach binding decisions pertaining to their interests. Some of the primary 
cooperatives exploited this opportunity and endorsed the idea of not using the 
KNCU to sell their coffee because of the lack of timely payments. It was at 
this point that a former Marketing Manager of the KNCU encouraged several 
leaders of primary cooperatives that had been operating under the aegis of the 
KNCU to break away and form an alternative marketing organisation, which 
came to be known as G-32. G-32 members claim that their organisation was 
founded to provide an alternative window for coffee farmers, who, as a result 
of market liberalisation, could now sell through the KNCU or the private sector.
G-32, which was established in 2002/03 and legally recognised in 2007, is a 
joint venture. The primary cooperatives that form G-32 remain members of the 
KNCU, and they participate in all KNCU activities except voting during the 
annual general meetings. G-32 detached itself from the KNCU in the 2002/03 
coffee season and started to collect and sell its own coffee (Mhando & Mbeyale, 
2010). G-32 claims that it disengage from KNCU because the latter failed to 
meet some of its obligations; specifi cally, the KNCU failed to pay farmers on 
time for coffee and collected levies from farmers, and KNCU leaders embezzled 
money from the organisation (Mhando, et al, 2013). However, some of the 
founding members of G-32 have withdrawn from that organisation and decided 
to do business with the KNCU, which, given that 70 of 92 primary cooperatives 
also still do business with the KNCU, suggests that this organisation is not all 
bad. During formal and informal discussions, members of the Mshiri, Materuni, 
and Lyamungo primary societies noted that the break from the KNCU was based 
on the personal interests of some of the primary cooperative leaders in addition 
to the low prices it offered to farmers.
II. Counter-arguments Regarding Establishment of G-32
As expected, the KNCU, which lost 22 of its members, did not respond 
positively to the establishment of G-32. The KNCU depends on a union levy 
that is deducted from each kilogram it sells. Additionally, the departure of these 
members involved not only the loss of income but also the introduction of a 
competitor. The KNCU claimed that the 2002 Cooperative Societies Act bars 
the establishment of parallel cooperatives in a region where one overarching 
union (such as the KNCU) exists. They further argued that the 2002 Cooperative 
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Societies Act prohibits all activities undertaken by G-32, including providing 
extension services, exporting a commodity, and managing relationships with 
foreign buyers. On the other hand, G-32 argued that it was not intended to be 
parallel union challenging KNCU; instead, they claimed it was created to provide 
a new window that enables farmers to sell their coffee at premium prices. Mr. 
Godfrey Ulomi, the General Manager of G-32 and the former Marketing Manager 
of the KNCU, defended the G-32 as a legitimate group that has not violated 
the 2002 Cooperative Societies Act and that remains a member of that KNCU. 
He noted that G-32 has proven to be effective, has been able to secure loans 
from banks to pay farmers on time, and often attracts the best price in the world 
market. Last season, the group, which still has 22 active members, exported 
more than 180 tons of coffee, mainly to Japan. This debate between the KNCU 
and G-32 also confused the government authorities, which is why the latter was 
legally registered in 2007 even though it was found in 2002/03. 
Interviews with offi cers of cooperatives in Moshi Districts revealed that the 
Cooperative Department is more interested in the development of cooperatives 
in all forms (primary and secondary) than it is in farmers’ groups or organisations 
such as G-32. Despite the reasons advanced by G-32, it has been diffi cult for 
District offi cials to accept the withdrawals from the KNCU. This may be due 
to the fact that confl icts among KNCU members have been reported for many 
years, and even offi cials have failed to resolve them. District offi cials also noted 
the use of external factors as an excuse for breaking away from the KNCU. 
Based on the position and infl uence of the Chagga people in the economic and 
political arenas of Tanzania, the central government has tried to intervene, paying 
the debts of the KNCU to unify the Chagga. However, some politicians are 
using the same platform to divide the people for their own political gain.
Despite this situation, very little is being done by this department to train 
members regarding cooperatives and other technical aspects that would put them 
in a better position to compete on equal footing with private traders. The 
emergence of farmers’ groups in Mbozi District, Mbeya Region, is an indication 
that some of the farmers who are tired of the cooperatives’ way of trading have 
decided to take advantage of new opportunities to sell coffee on their own.
III. The Aftermath
What began as confl icts of interest among the members of the KNCU has 
resulted in the provision of another marketing window to farmers. The former 
monopoly status of the KNCU has been eroded, and this organisation has been 
challenged to improve its effi ciency with regard to coffee marketing and the 
delivery of services to its members. The KNCU is responding by committing 
itself to community development projects, such as building schools, providing 
scholarships to orphans, refurbishing schools and dispensaries, and distributing 
hybrid coffee clones at lower costs. G-32 has opened another window for coffee 
marketing, creating competition between the two organisations. Moreover, farmers 
have demonstrated that they do not need large bureaucratic organisations; instead, 
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they can work with a simple structure with lower operating costs, which increases 
their net income. On the other hand, 70 of 92 primary cooperatives are still 
selling coffee through the KNCU, which indicates that this organisation remains 
strong and is a force to be reckoned with. Moreover, the fact that some primary 
cooperatives have returned to the KNCU while others are withdrawing from 
this organisation implies that G-32 is not ideal. Confl icts of interest over KNCU 
leadership and the selfi shness of some of the primary cooperative leaders are 
also related to withdrawals from and subsequent returns to the KNCU.
CONCLUSION
Human beings fear confl ict because the outcomes of such processes are 
uncertain and unpredictable. Confl icts of interest among members and leaders 
of the KNCU escalated to the point that they could not be contained within the 
organisation, leading to the establishment of an alternative window for coffee 
marketing. Though feared, social confl icts should be interpreted in a positive 
light, as they sometimes result in positive changes (e.g., establishment of 
alternative marketing channels that provide an additional marketing window for 
farmers, enabling them to sell their produce to whoever pays the highest price). 
Indeed, a competitive environment is better for business than the one dominated 
by a monopoly. Additionally, the competing agents have also signifi cantly 
improved the services delivered to their members (e.g., timely payment of dues, 
provision of farm inputs and extension services, etc.). These strategies are being 
implemented to attract and retain members. The new developments in coffee 
marketing related to economic liberalisation will motivate farmers to work harder 
to increase production and thereby serve a wider market.
However, it should be noted that although confl icts of interest cannot be 
avoided, they can yield undesirable outcomes if they escalate beyond a certain 
point. The withdrawals from and returns to the KNCU refl ect the continued 
power of this cartel in relation to coffee marketing, even though the creation 
of another marketing window has provided new opportunities and challenges to 
all actors in the coffee value chain in Moshi, Tanzania. 
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